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PRIVATE BUSINESS DISTRICTS AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
FROM MARSH TO TANNER
GUS BAUMAN*
The post-World War II flight from the central cities to the suburbs
opened America's bedroom community doors to the rising shopping
center phenomenon. During the past two decades shopping centers
have evolved into "shopping cities," with acres of parking lots, multi-
leveled covered malls featuring temperature-controlled climates and
scores of stores, as well as restaurants, hotels, medical clinics, theaters,
auditoriums and a host of other features, all of it on privately-owned
property and all of it designed to draw an increasingly larger public.
Those who wish to communicate some idea to the public have in-
variably followed its movement.
The inevitable conflict between the right of the property owner
to control his land and the first amendment right of freedom of ex-
pression has led to three significant Supreme Court decisions that
concern, respectively, a company-owned town and two shopping cen-
ters.% In the first two cases, the Court struck a balance for the first
amendment; in the most recent case, the fifth amendment property
right prevailed. The purpose of this note is to consider whether
these cases can be reconciled and what their possible impact may be
on the growing movement to build large-scale private developments
in the downtown areas of our cities.
I. THE LAw: MARSH, LoGAN VALLEY AND TANNER
A. Marsh v. Alabama
In Marsh v. Alabama,2 a Jehovah's Witness was prosecuted for
criminal trespass when she ignored the warning of a deputy sheriff
* Third year student, Washington University School of Law; B.A., Clark
University, 1971.
1. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972); Amalgamated Food Em-
ployees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968); Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
2. 326 U.S. 501 (1946). The companion case, Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S.
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that her distribution of religious handbills on the sidewalk of a
company-owned town's "business block" violated notices posted by
the company against solicitation. 3 In an opinion by Justice Black,
the Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding: "Ownership
does not always mean absolute dominion. The more an owner, for
his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general,
the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and
constitutional rights of those who use it."4 The Court emphasized
the totality of ownership by the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation,5
and in particular, the role of the "business block" as the town shop-
ping center:
The "business block" serves as the community shopping center
and is freely accessible and open to the people in the area and
those passing through. The managers appointed by the corpora-
tion cannot curtail the liberty of press and religion of these
people consistently with the purposes of the Constitutional guar-
antees .... 6
The Court explained that because the town served a "public func-
tion"7 it was subject to the restrictions of the first amendment,8 which
in constitutional law occupies a "preferred position"O when balanced
517 (1946), concerned the arrest of a Jehovah's Witness in a federal govern-
ment-owned town.
3. 326 U.S. at 503.
4. Id. at 506.
5. The Court explained:
The town, a suburb of Mobile, Alabama, known as Chickasaw, is owned by
the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation. Except for that it has all the charac-
teristics of any other American town. The property consists of residential
buildings, streets, a system of sewers, a sewage disposal plant and a "business
block" on which business places are situated. A deputy of the Mobile County
Sheriff, paid by the company, serves as the town's policeman. Merchants
and service establishments have rented the stores and business places on the
business block and the United States uses one of the places as a post office
from which six carriers deliver mail to the people of Chickasaw and the
adjacent area.
Id. at 502-03.
6. Id. at 508.
7. Id. at 506; see notes 51-56 and accompanying text infra.
8. 326 U.S. at 508.
9. 326 U.S. at 509; accord, Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115
(1943); Jones v. Opelika, 319 U.S. 103 (1943) (adopting Chief Justice Stone's
dissent in Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 608 (1942)).
The "preferred position" of first amendment rights was a doctrine first argued
in a famous footnote by Justice Stone in United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.,
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against the fifth amendment property rights. 0 In a concurring opin-
ion, Justice Frankfurter reasoned even further that a company town's
property relations could in no way control vital civil liberties."
B. Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v.
Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.
Twenty-two years later, in a second landmark opinion, the Court,
having earlier declined to consider the question, 2 extended the Marsh
rationale to shopping centers. The Court held in Logan Valley"
that a state court injunction barring petitioners from the premises
of a shopping center on the grounds of trespass violated their rights
under the first and fourteenth amendments.' 4
Petitioners were nonemployee labor union members engaged in
peaceful picketing of a nonunion supermarket located in Logan
Valley Mall near Altoona, Pennsylvania." Speaking for the Court,
304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Justice Stone wrote that "more exacting judicial
scrutiny" must be applied to limitations on political processes than on ordinary
commercial transactions. Id. In a concurring opinion in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
U.S. 77 (1949), Justice Frankfurter reviewed the "preferred position" doctrine
and rejected it as a simplistic formula in constitutional analysis. Yet he did not
reject the modem idea that the first amendment occupies a special place within
the Constitution. Id. at 90.
10. 326 U.S. at 509.
11. He stated:
Title to property as defined by State law controls property relations; it can-
not control issues of civil liberties which arise precisely because a company
town is a town as well as a congeries of property relations. And similarly the
technical distinctions on which a finding of "trespass" so often depends are
too tenuous to control decision regarding the scope of the vital liberties
guaranteed by the Constitution.
326 U.S. at 511.
12. Amalgamated Meat Cutters Union v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S. 20,
24 (1957).
13. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
14. Id. at 309, 315.
15. Following the issuance of the injunction, petitioners commenced picketing
and handbilling outside the shopping center along the public roads. Because the
case was disposed of on constitutional grounds, the Court never reached the
federal pre-emption questions of the National Labor Relations Act. 391 U.S. at
309-10 n.l.
It is not within the scope of this Note to consider the large field of labor law
and private property. For analyses of this complex area see Broomfield, Pre-
emptive Federal Jurisdiction Over Concerted Trespassory Union Activity, 83
HARv. L. Rv. 552 (1970); Gould, Union Organizational Rights and the Con-
cept of "Quasi-Public" Property, 49 MINN. L. Rav. 505 (1965); Comment,
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Justice Marshall explained: "We start from the premise that peace-
ful picketing carried on in a location open generally to the public
is, absent other factors involving the purpose or manner of the picket-
ing, protected by the First Amendment."' But the Court quickly
moved past the specific right to picket and focused its inquiry on the
general exercise of all first amendment rights in "public places."17
The Court specifically held that handbilling within the shopping
center mall was certainly protected.""
Citing Marsh, the Court pointed out that the similarities between
the "business block" in the company town and the shopping center
in Logan Valley were striking.1 9 "The general public has unrestricted
access to the mall property. The shopping center here is clearly the
functional equivalent of the business district of Chickasaw involved
in Marsh2O [and therefore] ...for First Amendment purposes must
be treated in substantially the same manner."21
Expanding the Right of Nonemployee Union Organizers to Solicit on Company
Property: Industrial Parks and Retail Stores, 21 BUFFALO L. Rxv. 451 (1972);
Comment, The Unions, Free Speech, and the Shopping Center, 37 S. CAL. L.
REv. 573 (1964); Note, Shopping Centers and Labor Relations Law, 10 STAN.
L. REv. 694 (1958).
16. 391 U.S. at 313; accord, NLRB v. Fruit Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58
(1964); Teamsters Local 795 v. Newell, 356 U.S. 341 (1958); Bakery Drivers
Local 802 v. Woh, 315 U.S. 769 (1942); AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941);
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); cf., e.g., Taggart v. Weinacker's,
Inc., 397 U.S. 223 (1970); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Vogt, Inc., 354
U.S. 284 (1957); Plumbers Local 10 v. Graham, 345 U.S. 192 (1952); Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950); Giboney v. Empire
Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
17. 391 U.S. at 315; accord, Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943) (right
to leaflet on the streets) ; Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (leaflet-
ting on city streets cannot be prohibited); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939)
(no ordinance can prohibit leafletting in public places); Lovell v. City of Griffin,
303 U.S. 444 (1938) (municipality cannot subject to a permit the right to leaflet).
18. 391 U.S. at 322 n.11.
19. Id. at 317.
20. Id. at 318.
21. Id. at 325 (emphasis added). The Court explained:
We see no reason why access to a business district in a company town for
the purposes of exercising First Amendment rights should be constitutionally
required, while access for the same purpose to property functioning as a
business district should be limited simply because the property surrounding
the "business district" is not under the same ownership. Here the roadways
provided for vehicular movement within the mall and the sidewalks leading
from building to building are the functional equivalents of the streets and
sidewalks of a normal municipal business district. The shopping center
premises are open to the public to the same extent as the commercial center




In language as crucial as the "functional equivalent" language,
Justice Marshall then carefully explained that all Logan Valley de-
cided was that because the shopping center is the community business
block, state trespass laws could not wholly exclude "those members
of the public wishing to exercise their First Amendment rights on
the premises in a manner and for a purpose generally consonant with
the use to which the property is actually put."22 It would be this
language that the Tanner Court would later seize upon largely to
justify its decision.23
Justice Black, the author of the Marsh opinion, dissented sharply
in Logan Valley on behalf of respondents' property rights, stating that
"Marsh was never intended to apply to this kind of situation."24 He
ignored the Court's dicta which both recognized the advent of the
suburban shopping center and expressed apprehension that the
suburbs would immunize themselves from communicants' ideas with
a "cordon sanitaire" of parking lots.2 5
22. Id. at 319-20 (emphasis added). In an important footnote, the Court
added it was not considering whether respondents' property rights could justify
a ban on picketing that was not "directly related" in its purpose to the use to
which the property was being put. Id. at 320 n.9.
23. Of course, the Court in Logan Valley held that "reasonable regulations"
governing first amendment rights on private property were permissible. .d. at
320; accord, e.g., Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968); Adderley v.
Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965); Cant-
well v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S.
147 (1939); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939). But prohibition is not regula-
tion. 391 U.S. at 316; accord, Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939).
24. 391 U.S. at 330. Justice Harlan dissented, arguing this was a labor case
under the National Labor Relations Act and not a constitutional case. Id. at 333.
Justice White dissented, arguing the public had no "general invitation" to come
onto the premises but only an invitation to shop. Id. at 338.
But Justice White's reasoning also ironically foreshadowed the argument of
the dissenters in Tanner:
Nonobstructive handbilling for religious purposes, political campaigning,
protests against government policies-the Court would apparently place all
of these activities carried out on Logan Valley's property within the protec-
tion of the First Amendment, although the activites may have no connection
whatsoever with the views of the Plaza's occupants or with the conduct of
their businesses.
Id. at 339 (emphasis added).
25. The Court explained:
The economic development of the United States in the last twenty years
reinforces our opinion of the correctness of the approach taken in Marsh.
The large-scale movement of this country's population from the cities to the
suburbs has been accompanied by the suburban shopping center, typically
a cluster of individual retail units on a single large privately owned tract....
Washington University Open Scholarship
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C. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner
In Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,26 respondents distributed antiwar hand-
bills in the malls of Lloyd Center, a 50-acre shopping center in
Portland, Oregon. The Center maintained a policy prohibiting all
handbilling on its premises.27 Respondents were peaceful and no
littering occurred.28 Threatened with arrest for trespass by peti-
tioner's private police, respondents left the Center and subsequently
obtained an injunction and declaratory relief in federal court.25 The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that asserted first amendment rights
could not prevail on petitioner's private property when the hand-
billing was contrary to petitioner's wishes, contrary to the Center's
policy, and unrelated to the shopping center's operations3 0
Justice Powell, speaking for the Court, distinguished Logan Valley
on two facts. First, the handbilling in Lloyd Center had no "rela-
don" to any purpose for which the Center was being used.a1 Quoting
Justice White's dissent in Logan Valley, the Court explained that
Business enterprises located in downtown areas would be subject to on-the-
spot public criticism for their practices, but businesses situated in the suburbs
could largely immunize themselves from similar criticism by creating a
cordon sanitaire of parking lots around their stores. Neither precedent nor
policy compels a result so at variance with the goal of free expression and
communication that is the heart of the First Amendment.
Id. at 324-25.
26. 407 U.S. 551 (1972). In the companion case Central Hardware Co. v.
NLRB, 407 U.S. 539 (1972), the entire Court agreed that union solicitation of
employees during an organization campaign on the parking lot of a free-standing
store was a labor law case and not under Logan Valley. Justices Marshall,
Douglas, and Brennan dissented, however, believing the case should have been
remanded to the N.L.R.B. instead of the court of appeals. For further discussion
of labor law, as it applies to private property, see note 15 supra.
27. See notes 37-40 and accompanying text infra.
28. 407 U.S. at 556.
29. Tanner v. Lloyd Corp., 308 F. Supp. 128 (D. Ore. 1970). The court,
citing Marsh and Logan Valley, noted:
Although the Mall's multi-level design is not yet common among modern
shopping centers, the Mall is a prototype for future city planning. Its park-
ing facilities and sidewalks serve the same purpose as streets and sidewal:s
of a public business district. I find that the Mall is the functional equivalent
of a public business district.
Id. at 130.
The court of appeals affirmed per curiam, holding that the opinion was not
an extension of Marsh and Logan Valley. Tanner v. Lloyd Corp., 446 F.2d 545,
546 n.1 (9th Cir. 1971).
30. 407 U.S. at 552, 567.
31. Id. at 564.
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the only invitation to the general public was the one to do business
with the Center's tenants.3 2 The Court specifically ruled that the
private shopping center was not "dedicated to the public use."33
Second, whereas the union picketers in Logan Valley would not have
been able to adequately convey their message had they been denied
access to the Center, respondents' antiwar handbilling could reach
pedestrians and automobile occupants on the public sidewalks and
streets surrounding Lloyd Center, thereby providing respondents
with an alternative avenue of communication.34
In a bitter dissent, Justice Marshall, 5 the author of the Logan
Valley opinion, attacked the majority for making distinctions that
did not exist because "it is Logan Valley itself that the Court finds
bothersome."O The dissent found that Lloyd Center was even more
32. Id.
33. Id. at 569. Justice Powell wrote: "The argument reaches too far. The
Constitution by no means requires such an attenuated doctrine of dedication of
private property to public use." Id.; accord, McLeod v. College of Artesia, 312
F. Supp. 498, 501 (D.N.M. 1970) (private college campus). Contra, Wolin v.
Port of N.Y. Authority, 392 F.2d 83, 88 (2d Cir. 1968) (bus terminal dedicated
to the public use); Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union v. Wonderland Shop-
ping Center, Inc., 370 Mich. 547, 565, 122 N.W.2d 785, 795 (1963) (equally di-
vided court affirmed dedication of shopping center mall); State v. Williams, 44
L.R.R.M. 2357, 2359 (Baltimore Md. Crim. Ct. 1959) (shopping center); For-
kosch, Picketing in Shopping Centers, 26 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 250, 264 (1969)
(effect of Logan Valley is to consider a shopping center as dedicated to the
public use, thereby requiring it to permit handbilling subject to reasonable regula-
tion). But see Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 643 (1951):
In the Marsh case it was a private corporation, in the Tucker case the United
States, that owned the property used as permissive passways in company
and government-owned towns. In neither case was there dedication to public
use but it seems fair to say that the permissive use of the ways was con-
sidered equal to such dedication.
34. 407 U.S. at 566. Contra, Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 163
(1939): "[O1ne is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appro-
priate places abridged on the piea that it may be exercised in some other place.";
accord, Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,
391 U.S. 308, 323-24 (1968).
The dissent in Tanner argued that the Court's ruling would require respond-
ents to approach moving traffic at the shopping center's entrances, thereby
arbitrarily overturning the trial court's findings of fact that this would create a
safety hazard to respondents, other pedestrians, and the automobile passengers.
407 U.S. at 583 n.7.
35. Justices Douglas, Brennan and Stewart joined the dissent.
36. 407 U.S. at 584. Justice Marshall continued: "The vote in Logan Valley
was 6-3, and that decision is only four years old. But, I am aware that the corn-
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of a public place than the smaller Logan Valley Plaza had been:
the mall covered 25 of Lloyd Center's 50 acres 7 contained a
range of professional and non-professional services not found in
Logan Valley (including a skating rink and auditorium),3s was in-
tertwined more with the city's streets, and, unlike Logan Valley, had
its private police commissoned with full police powers by the city.30
A city ordinance had vacated eight acres of public streets and pro.
vided for the construction of new streets and additional traffic con-
trols so that Lloyd Corporation could develop, in the words of the
city council, a "general retail business district." 40
Finding the Center the functional equivalent of a public "business
district,"41 the dissent then shifted to the first amendment issue.
Various organizations had been allowed to use the malls, auditorium,
and other facilities: the Cancer Society, Boy and Girl Scouts, Amer-
ican Legion, Salvation Army, Volunteers of America, and presiden-
tial candidates.42 Because the Center had been opened to noncom-
mercial uses, including first amendment activities, respondents could
not be discriminatorily "excluded" from handbilling "solely because
Lloyd Center was not enamored of the form or substance of their
speech."43 Since respondents' activity in the "functional equivalent
of a business district" was "generally consonant with the use" to
which the Center was actually put, Logan Valley's two-pronged test
dearly was satisfied. 44
position of this Court has radically changed in four years. The fact remains that
Logan Valley is binding unless and until it is overruled." Id.
For post-Tanner critiques of the new Court see Bender, The Techniques ol
Subtle Erosion, 245 HARPER's MAGAZINE 18, 32 (Dec. 1972) and Drew, The
Nixon Court, 230 THE ATLANTic MONTHLY 6, 14 (Nov. 1972).
37. 407 U.S. at 571.
38. Id. at 553.
39. Id. at 575.
40. Id. at 576. In actuality, Lloyd Corporation owned 130 city blocks (which
included Lloyd Center) and was developing the downtown area in accordance
with a master plan. Brief for Respondents at 25, Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407
U.S. 551 (1972).
41. 407 U.S. at 576.
42. Id. at 555, 578. In addition, football rallies, antique automobile shows,
and musical concerts were permitted at the Center. But the March of Dimes and
Hadassah (a national Zionist women's service organization) were denied access
to the malls and walkways. Brief for Respondents at 5, 6, Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,
407 U.S. 551 (1972).
43. 407 U.S. at 578.
44. Id. Justice Marshall concluded: "I believe that the lower courts correctly
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Even if Lloyd Center had not been open to first amendment ac-
tivity, the dissent argued Logan Valley would still apply because
freedom of speech occupied a "preferred position" over property
rights. 45 For many citizens, Lloyd Center, because of its large and
varied offerings of goods and services, was the only public place
where they might encounter the views of other citizens; and for those
citizens who could not afford access to the mass media, handbilling
and other forms of relatively inexpensive means of communication
were the only ways they could express themselves to a broad range
of citizens.46 Petitioner's interests, on the other hand, paled in com-
parison.47
1. State Action
To apply the first amendment to the states and their subdivisions
through the fourteenth amendment requires a showing of "state ac-
tion."'4 Only the "state" can violate one's first and fourteenth amend-
held that respondents' activities were directly related in purpose to the use to
which the shopping center was being put." Id. at 579 (emphasis added).
45. Id. at 580; see note 9 supra.
46. 407 U.S. at 580. Indeed, Justice Black had once argued strongly that the
political views of the "little people" must take precedence over property and
trespass rights, and that a citizen should receive information wherever he desires
to receive it:
Of course, as every person acquainted with political life knows, door to door
campaigning is one of the most accepted techniques of seeking popular sup-
port, while the circulation of nominating papers would be greatly handi-
capped if they could not be taken to the citizens in their homes. Door to
door distribution of circulars is essential to the poorly financed causes of
little people.
Freedom to distribute information to every citizen wherever he desires to
receive it is so clearly vital to the preservation of a free society that, putting
aside reasonable police and health regulations of time and manner of distri-
bution, it must be fully preserved. The dangers of distribution can so easily
be controlled by traditional legal methods, leaving to each householder the
full right to decide whether he will receive strangers as visitors, that stringent
prohibition can serve no purpose but that forbidden by the Constitution, the
naked restriction of the dissemination of ideas.
Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943) (emphasis added). For a de-
scription of Tanner's impact on a political contest see note 81 infra.
47. 407 U.S. at 581. The arguments that handbilling might disturb the shop-
pers and create litter were dismissed as illogical, frivolous, and unconstitutional
because other non-shopping events occurred at the mall and because littering is
not a sufficient reason for barring first amendment activity; see, e.g., Martin v.
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147,
162 (1939).
48. The application of the first amendment through the fourteenth amendment
was first described in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
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ment rights, although that term's meaning and use has had various
applications.49 Exactly what constitutes state action has often been
a confusing, vague and difficult problem, particularly in the first
amendment area. Professor Thomas Emerson wrote: "State action
has developed primarily in the equal protection area .... There are
not many Supreme Court decisions dealing with state action in a
First Amendment context. But those that exist seem to indicate that
the doctrine will be liberally extended to the activities of private
associations."50 Tanner, as will be seen, has limited this development
in the law.
Aside from formal operation of a state agency, Emerson notes the
three main tests for state action: first, the degree of government in-
volvement in the private party; second, the public nature of the
function performed by the private party; or third, court jurisdiction
over the internal affairs of a private party through common law
doctrine. 51 Marsh and Logan Valley are Emerson's examples of the
second or "public function" test,5 2 and an analysis of those opinions
49. See, e.g., Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387
U.S. 369 (1967); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); Evans v.
Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365
U.S. 715 (1961); Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951); Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945);
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
50. THOMAS I. EMIERSON, THE SYSTEi OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSiON 678
(1970).
51. Id. at 678-80; see Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV.
L. REv. 1065, 1070-71 (1969).
52. Accord, Berle, Constitutional Limitations on Corporate Activity-Protec.
tlion of Personal Rights from Invasion Through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L.
REv. 933, 948 (1952); Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLUm. L. R v.
1083, 1097, 1121 (1960); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV.
L. REv. 1065, 1071 (1969); Note, Shopping Centers and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment: Public Function and State Action, 33 U. PITT. L. REv. 112, 119 (1971);
cf. Abernathy, Expansion of the State Action Concept Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 375, 412 (1958) (state action in Marsh was the
trespass prosecution, under the judicial intervention doctrine of Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1 (1948)). See also Black, "State Action;" Equal Protection, and Call-fornia's Proposition 14, 81 IiARv. L. Rzv. 69 (1967); Horowitz, The Misleading
Search for "State Action" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 S. CAL. L. Rv.
208, 217 (1957); Van Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. REv. 3, 40-45
(1961).
One interesting sidelight: In Cottonwood Mall Shopping Center, Inc. v. Utah
Power & Light Co., 440 F.2d 36, 42 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 857
(1971), the court held that a shopping center employing a total energy plan
for its tenants could be regulated as a public utility because the deliberate ben-
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proves him correct. 3 Although state action in Tanner might be
found in the extent of government involvement- or in the judicial
eficiary of the lighting, air conditioning, etc. was the public, and that the "public
characteristics" of the modern shopping center predominated "whatever may be
the ntture of legal title." The court cited Logan Valley. See Forkosch, supra
note 33.
53. In Marsh, the Court noted that "public places" are open to first amend-
ment activity (326 U.S. at 504), and that because the company town serves a
"public function," it may be regulated by the state (326 U.S. at 506). This
analysis follows the doctrine laid down in Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939),
that first amendment rights are protected from state action through the four-
teenth amendment due process clause when:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially
been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have
been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens,
and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places
has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights,
and liberties of citizens.
Id. at 515 (emphasis added). See, e.g., Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe,
402 U.S. 415 (1971) (handbilling); Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111
(1969) (parading); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (library sit-in);
Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951) (street meeting); Saia v. New York,
334 U.S. 558 (1948) (soundtruck); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940) (soliciting); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (handbilling).
But see Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968) (picketing); Adderley v.
Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (trespassing jailgrounds); Breard v. City of Alex-
andria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) (door-to-door soliciting); Feiner v. New York, 340
U.S. 315 (1951) (sidewalk speech); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949)
(soundtruck); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (parading).
In Logan Valley, the Court likewise refers to the Hague public places doctrine
(391 U.S. at 315), and therefore argues that the state may not use its trespass
laws to exclude first amendment rights (391 U.S. at 319). Indeed, the dissent
in Tanner noted that the "critical issue" in Logan Valley was whether private
property was "public" enough to warrant the fourteenth amendment reaching
it (407 U.S. at 581 n.5). Accord, Diamond v. Bland, 3 Cal. 3d 653, 477 P.2d
733, 91 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971) (state action
in a shopping center's refusal to permit the exercise of first amendment rights in
public areas).
54. The city ordinance provided for the vacating of public streets and the
spending of public funds to spur Lloyd Center's development. In addition, the
Center used city-commissioned private police and city streets traversed and sur-
rounded the Center. The district court, in fact, found state action because the
Center's security guards had police authority from the city and exercised that
authority. Tanner v. Lloyd Corp., 308 F. Supp. 128, 131 (D. Ore. 1970);
accord, Sutherland v. Southcenter Shopping Center, Inc., 3 Wash. App. 833,
-, 478 P.2d 792, 794 (1971); see, e.g., Farmer v. Moses, 232 F. Supp. 154,
158 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) ("[World's] Fair Corporation and its operations are so
impregnated with and supported by state and city action as to place them within
the ambit of the Fourteenth Amendment."). But see Chumley v. Santa Anita
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application of trespass law,55 Hague v. CIO,6 Marsh, and Logan
Valley dearly necessitate the use of the public function test.
Yet the Tanner Court brushed aside Logan Valley's "functional
equivalent of a public business district" language as unnecessary
dictum,5 7 thereby voiding any credible public function analysis. If
Logan Valley Plaza served no public function, then there could have
been no state action, and therefore no first amendment violation
could have occurred. Of course, that was not the result in Logan
Valley.58 The dissent in Tanner could have made a stronger argu-
ment by focusing on this logical inconsistency inherent in the ma-
jority's reasoning.59
A second problem was revealed when the Court specifically ad-
dressed itself to the state action question. Justice Powell wrote that
the first and fourteenth amendments safeguard rights from "state
action, not .. .action by the owner of private property used non-
discriminatorily for private purposes only."60 Why "nondiscrimina-
torily"? If the property were truly private with no public function
characteristics, then petitioner had the right to discriminate, as it
surely did by refusing respondents but permitting other groups access
to the property.61 Or did the Court mean that the property owner
can open his premises to one kind of first amendment activity and
yet deny access to another kind as long as no exception were made
Consol., Inc., 15 Cal. App. 3d 452, 458, 93 Cal. Rptr. 77, 81 (Dist. Ct. App.
1971) (state licensing of race track is not sufficient state action). Note:
Without government intervention . . . a downtown shopping center is out
of the question. In Torrington, [Conn.] the city condemned and cleared the
land at a cost of $2,500,000. The Federal government paid two-thirds of the
cost, the State government paid one-sixth, and the city paid one-sixth. The
developer bought the land at public auction for $455,000, and developed
450,000 square feet of gross leasable area on it.
43 CHAIN STORE AGE 38, 40 (May 1967) (emphasis added).
55. See Abernathy, supra note 52.
56. See note 53 supra.
57. 407 U.S. at 562.
58. See notes 13-14 and accompanying text supra.
59. See notes 52-56 and accompanying text supra.
60. 407 U.S. at 567.
61. In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court of California ruled:
The shopping center may no more exclude individuals who wear long hair
or unconventional dress, who are black, who are members of the John Birch
Society, or who belong to the American Civil Liberties Union merely be-
cause of these characteristics or associations, than may the City of San Rafael.
In re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d 205, 217, 474 P.2d 992, 1000, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24, 32 (1970).
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(here, all handbilling was prohibited)? If that is the case, then the
March of Dimes and Hadassah, which were prohibited from solidt-
ing by the shopping center, would apparently have grounds to sue
since the Cancer Society and Salvation Army were allowed on the
premises to solicit funds from the public. 62 The negative implication
of Justice Powell's statement was that to discriminate is to violate
the law (the first amendment?), although "why" was not made dear
since the property's private nature was held to be so much more
important than any first amendment right.
6 3
2. Emasculation of Logan Valley
Tanner went to great lengths to distinguish Logan Valley and yet
it failed. The situations in both cases were virtually the same. Even
when Logan Valley was read narrowly to mean that first amendment
activity not aimed at some specific shopping center or tenant use
was not protected, the Court carried its analysis too far. Justice
Powell stated that although Logan Valley extended Marsh, it did so
only as to first amendment activities "related" to the shopping cen-
ter's operations, and that the thrice-used "functional equivalent of a
public business district" language in Logan Valley was unnecessary
to the Logan Valley decision because Justice Black's dissent in that
case emphasized that such language was a misinterpretation of
Marsh.64
A problem with this reasoning is that the Court equated the
"directly related" language (the relationship between the first amend-
ment activity and the nature of the property's use) with the "func-
tional equivalent" language (similarities between kinds of commercial
centers). Having made this equation, the Court then focused on
the limiting language in Logan Valley to achieve an opposite but
62. See note 42 supra.
63. It would be an unwarranted infringement of property rights to require
them to yield to the exercise of First Amendment rights under circumstances
where adequate alternative avenues of communication exist. Such an accom-
modation would diminish property rights without significantly enhancing the
asserted right of free speech.
407 U.S. at 567. Yet the Court never escaped the dilemma that the denial of
expression in Tanner was real, while any diminishing of the property right would
have been, at the most, only minimal. The "preferred position" doctrine was
simply banished.
64. 407 U.S. at 562.
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legitimate result and with the same stroke destroyed the heart of
Logan Valley for any viable future application.5
To argue also that some first amendment activities may "use" the
Center's premises but that others may not is to negate both the
thrust and substance of the point that a shopping center is open to
first amendment activities "generally consonant with the use to
which the property is actually put." 6 Indeed, there is little logic in
arguing, as Logan Valley did, the preferred position of broad first
amendment rights, and then limiting those rights to narrow circum-
stances as Tanner does.67 Various pre-Tanner courts follow this rea-
soning.68
65. Justice Powell wrote:
The holding in Logan Valley was not dependent upon the suggestion that
the privately owned streets and sidewalks of a business district or a shopping
center are the equivalent, for First Amendment purposes, of municipally
owned streets and sidewalks. No such expansive reading of the opinion for
the Court is necessary or appropriate.
Id. at 563.
66. Judge Kaufman, referring to the N.Y. Port Authority Bus Terminal,
stated:
The admission of charity solicitors, glee clubs and automobile exhibitions
without untoward incident evidences the ease with which the Terminal
accommodates different forms of communication. To deny access to political
communication seems an anomalous inversion of our fundamental values....
In some situations the place represents the object of protest, the seat of
authority against which the protest is directed. . . . In other situations, theplace is where the relevant audience may be found. Here, the plaintiff is
attempting to communicate his antiwar protest to the general public.
Wolin v. Port of N.Y. Authority, 392 F.2d 83, 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 940 (1968); accord, In re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d 845, 851, 434 P.2d 353,
356, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97, 100 (1967) (also an antiwar handbilling case): "iT]he
test is not whether petitioners' use of the station was a railway use but whether
it interfered with that use. No interest of the city in the functioning of the station
as a transportation terminal was infringed."
67. To give the use of the term "consonant with" an interpretation restricted
to "directly related to retail functions" would seem, to us, to render mean-
ingless Logan Valley's earlier carefully developed delineation of the broad
rights of the public to engage in certain First Amendment practices, in areas
that are the functional equivalent of public streets and sidewalks on privateproperty, regardless of the precise nature of the surrounding commercial
enterprises.
Sutherland v. Southcenter Shopping Center, Inc., 3 Wash. App. 833, -, 478
P.2d 792, 798-99 (1971).
Most commentators agreed that although Logan Valley is not direct authority
for protecting speech unrelated to the property:
mo enforce a broad denial of unrelated speech on private property would
result in defeating free and socially valuable speech while at the same timeprotecting an ownership interest which is little more than a shadow. Clearly
this is not the result which is sought by the Court in Logan Valley.
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II. IMPACT OF PRIVATE BUSINESS DISTRICTS
Bookmaking, to be sure, is available at few centers. But many
other activities formerly associated with large cities are becom-
48 B.U.L. Rnv. 699, 706 (1968) (emphasis added); accord, The Supreme Court
-1967 Term, 82 HIAv. L. REv. 63, 130, 137 (1968); Comment, The Shopping
Center: Quasi-Public Forum for Suburbia, 6 U. SAN FRANCISco L. REV. 103,
107 (1971); 35 BROOKLYN L. REv.. 101, 108 (1968); 18 BUFFALO L. REV. 364,
372 (1968-69); 73 DIcK. L. REv. 519, 531 (1969); 48 N.D.L. RyV. 140, 143
(1971). But see Forkosch, supra note 33; 53 MINN. L. Rlv. 873, 881 (1969);
33 U. PITT. L. REv. 112, 115 (1971).
Indeed, one commentator who read Logan Valley narrowly argued that the
shopping center in Tanner v. Lloyd Corp., 308 F. Supp. 128 (D. Ore. 1970),
exercised a public function:
While the narrow holding in Logan Valley may be justifiable since busi-
nesses in a suburban shopping center should not be able to evade public
criticism by surrounding their stores with parking lots, the owners of a
shopping center should not be required to assume all the constitutional
obligations of a municipality.... [but] [f]or example, in Tanner v. Lloyd, a
shopping center was prevented from prohibiting first amendment activity
not directly related to the functioning of the mall. But it was pointed out
in the opinion that the shopping center served the community as more than
just a place to shop. The mall was the scene of football rallies for area high
schools, served as a forum for local candidates for political office, and even
presidential candidates spoke at the mall. The shopping center tried to take
on the appearance of a town and was assuming a public function. If the cor-
porate owner wishes to permit and even encourages this type of activity, it
is not too great a burden to allow the reasonable exercise of first amendment
activity, just as it would seem unfair to allow him to permit only political
candidates and activity with views which the owner is in agreement to use the
mall.
33 U. PITT. L. RLv. 112, 118-19 (1971) (emphasis added).
68. The Supreme Court of California has consistently followed the Hague-
Marsh-Logan Valley line: Diamond v. Bland, 3 Cal. 3d 653, 477 P.2d 733, 91
Cal. Rptr. 501 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971) (in facts almost
identical to Tanner, first amendment activities unrelated to the business of a
shopping center could not be prohibited from the analogue of the "traditional
town square"); see In re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d 205, 474 P.2d 992, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24
(1970); In re Lane, 71 Cal. 2d 872, 457 P.2d 561, 79 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1969)
(preferred position of first amendment precludes trespass conviction for hand-
billing on premises of a single store); In re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d 845, 434 P.2d
353, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1967) (because a privately-owned train station is like
a public street or park, antiwar handbilling is protected); Schwartz-Torrance
Inv. Corp. v. Bakery Workers Local 31, 61 Cal. 2d 766, 394 P.2d 921, 40 Cal.
Rptr. 233 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 906 (1965) (shopping center picketing
is only a theoretical invasion of private property).
Other shopping center cases: State v. Williams, 44 L.R.R.M. 2357 (Baltimore
Md. Crim. Ct. 1959) (property rights secondary to picket right on "quasi-
public" property); Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union v. Wonderland
Shopping Center, Inc., 370 Mich. 547, 122 N.W.2d 785 (1963) (equally divided
court affirmed right to handbill on "Chickasaw-like 'business block' "); State v.
Miller, 280 Minn. 566, 159 N.W.2d 895 (1968) (political handbilling protected
by Logan Valley); Blue Ridge Shopping Center, Inc. v. Schleininger, 432
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
ing increasingly important elements of shopping center life. At
today's shopping centers, you can buy or sell stock, stop in at a
political rally, view an art show, attend church, visit a psychi-
atrist, entertain friends at an expensive restaurant or take your
wife to a legitimate theater. A Philadelphia-area center even
offers a 2,500-seat psychedelic night dub.69
As of three years ago, 13,000 shopping centers were operating
in the United States, generating more than 40% of all retail
sales (excluding automobiles and building materials), with 12,000
additional centers predicted for the next fifteen years.7 0 By compari-
son, shopping centers in 1965 accounted for a quarter of the retail
trade71 In spite of, or more likely because of, this enormous com-
mercial growth, the role of the shopping center has changed. Where
S.W.2d 610 (Kansas City Ct. App. 1968) (handbilling protected by Logan
Valley); Freeman v. Retail Clerks Local 1207, 58 Wash. 2d 426, 363 P.2d 803
(1961) (NLRA pre-empts complaint against picketing); Sutherland v. South-
center Shopping Center, Inc., 3 Wash. App. 833, 478 P.2d 792 (1971) (shop-
ping center is functional equivalent of business district and cannot prohibit first
amendment activities); Moreland Corp. v. Retail Store Employees Local 444,
16 Wis. 2d 499, 114 N.W.2d 876 (1962) (dictum: property rights must yield
to freedom of communication).
See Jones v. Board of Regents, 436 F.2d 618 (9th Cir. 1970) (handbilling
in public areas of state university cannot be prohibited); Wolin v. Port of N.Y.
Authority, 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968) (hand-
billing in bus terminal); Marshall Field & Co. v. NLRB, 200 F.2d 375 (7th
Cir. 1952) (company-owned street); People v. St. Clair, 56 Misc. 2d 326, 288
N.Y.S.2d 388 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. 1968) (handbilling in subway); People v.
Barisi, 23 L.R.R.M. 2190 (N.Y.C. Magis. Ct. 1948) (picketing in train sta-
tion); cf. McLeod v. College of Artesia, 312 F. Supp. 498 (D.N.M. 1970)
(evidence insufficient to show a private campus is public); Farmer v. Moses, 232
F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (handbilling only permitted on public walks of
World's Fair); Chumley v. Santa Anita Consol., Inc., 15 Cal. App. 3d 452, 93
Cal. Rptr. 77 (Dist. Ct. App. 1971) (race track not analogous to a business
district); City of Chicago v. Rosser, 47 Ill. 2d 10, 264 N.E.2d 158 (1970) (sit-in
at office building); Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 297 N.Y. 339, 79 N.E.2d 433, cert. denied, 335 U.S. 886 (1948) (door-
to-door soliciting within large apartment complex); Hall v. Commonwealth, 188
Va. 72, 49 S.E.2d 369 (1948) (apartment building soliciting). Contra, People
v. Goduto, 21 Ill. 2d 605, 174 N.E.2d 385, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 927 (1961)
(handbilling on single-store public parking lot); Hood v. Stafford, 213 Tenn.
684, 378 S.W.2d 766 (1964) (picketing on single-store parking lot). But see In
re Ball, 23 Cal. App. 3d 380, 100 Cal. Rptr. 189 (Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (peti-
tioning on Disneyland pay parking lot that interfered with trams not protected
by first amendment).
69. Wall Street journal, Feb. 20, 1969, at 1, col. 6.
70. 47 CHAW STORE AGE 25 (Feb. 1971).
71. BusinEss WEEK, Sept. 4, 1971, at 34.
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once it served merely as the retail outlet for bedroom communities,
now, "with apartments, office buildings, and industrial parks moving
to the suburbs, the centers are finding they must be more than just
merchants." 72
Indeed, they are becoming "miniature downtowns," 73 offering a
myriad of goods, services, and functions, sprawling over large tracts
of land, mushrooming in size from neighborhood centers to com-
munity centers to regional centers to, finally, multi-leveled super-
regional centers.7 4 Presumably, all of these kinds of shopping cen-
ters, small and large alike, fall under the Tanner umbrella, for
although the Court never defined "shopping center,"7 5 Lloyd Center
was of the large, multi-level variety.7 1
A recent trend, however, is for a developer to return to the down-
town business district after the city has condemned an area and to
build a shopping center, thereby revitalizing "some of the very core
areas that are hit hardest by competition from suburban centers."77
Buffalo, New Haven, Jersey City and Springfield, Massachusetts are
examples of cities where downtown shopping centers have helped
spark revivals in decaying city centers.78 And on a more ambitious
scale, large, multi-block, multi-purpose, high-rise private city centers,
patterned after New York City's Rockefeller Center, appear to be
the latest design in urban living. Worcester Center in Massachusetts,
72. Wall Street Journal, Feb. 20, 1969, at 1, col. 6.
73. No longer are shopping centers simply the small retail hubs they used
to be .... Now, more and more, they are becoming miniature downtowns
with three, four, and five department stores, scores of smaller stores and
services, plus hotels, apartment houses, office buildings, cultural centers,
churches, and theaters.
BUSINESS WEEK, Sept. 4, 1971, at 34; see Breckenfeld, "Downtown" Has Fled
to the Suburbs, 86 FORTUNE 80 (Oct. 1972); SALES MANAGEmENT, Nov. 1, 1970,
at 34.
74. Neighborhood shopping centers account for 26.4% of shopping center
sales and cover up to 100,000 square feet of gross leasable area; community
centers: 30.5% and 101-200,000 square feet; regional centers: 43.1% and
201-800,000 square feet; super-regional centers: 8.2% and over 800,000 square
feet. Kaylin, A Profile of the Shopping Center Industry, 42 CHAIN STORE AGE
17 (May 1966).
75. In a passing remark, Logan Valley gave a functional definition: "MI]ypically
a cluster of individual retail units on a single large privately owned tract." 391
U.S. at 324.
76. 407 U.S. at 553.
77. BUSINESS WEEK, Sept. 4, 1971, at 34.
78. 43 CHAIN STORE AGE 38 (May 1967).
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
Illinois Center in Chicago,70 and the proposed Mercantile Center in
St. Louis80 are all but miniature cities.
With these recent trends in the scope and geographic location of
developing private "business districts," where does the first amend-
ment fit under the limitations set by Tanner? Are these downtown
centers even "business districts" within the Tanner meaning, or was
Tanner only talking about low-lying, multi-store tracts surrounded
by vast partking lots? Can, indeed, Tanner even apply to these differ-
ent forms of privately-owned developments? Though we cannot pre-
tend to give any answers, we can observe where the cases lead.
Most important is the realization of the growing economic and
political strength of privately-owned developments, be they shopping
centers or downtown centers. If political access to these areas is
closed off at the owner's discretion, then as they grow in number
and size, the first amendment right to hear and be heard is consider-
79. Illinois Center, now under construction on the downtown lakefront, is
a $1 billion, 83-acre complex which will include apartments for 50,000 people,
9.9 million square feet of office space, hotels, shopping, recreational and cultural
facilities. BusINEss WEax, Feb. 17, 1973, at 64. Other major planned projects:
Houston Center (a $1.5 billion office-hotel-retail store project on 33 downtown
blocks owned and to be developed by Texas Eastern Transmission Corp.), id. at
61; Detroit (a $500 million hotel-office-tower-commercial-housing project on 32
acres of Ford's downtown riverfront property), id. at 59; Crown Center (50-
building development by Hallmark Card Co. on 85 Kansas City acres), id. at 64;
Washington, D.C. (an $80 million complex of shops, offices, restaurants, an inn,
conference center and parks along the Potomac in Georgetown). Id. The article
notes:
In cities large and small, all over the U.S., an astonishing volume of invest-
ment is pouring into major enterprises aimed, like [architect-developer John)
Portman's, at maintaining or restoring the economic and social vitality of
drooping downtowns .... More important, in more than a dozen cities from
New York & Los Angeles to Fort Worth and Worcester, Mass., urban com-
plexes that are masterplanned and carefully designed either are under way
or are about to start.
Many of these ventures are entirely private undertakings, including some
being built by large corporations.
Id. at 60.
80. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Feb. 22, 1973, at 13A, col. 1. Indeed, entire
communities, one for as many as 12,000 people, are being planned by private
developers with shopping centers as their core. "Eventually, the developers of
these projects see the shopping center core as becoming a true 'downtown' area
much like the downtown areas of many major cities, a focal point for everything




ably weakened.-' And if center owners were "infuriated ' ' 82 with
Logan Valley and viewed Tanner as ending another "nuisance," 83 it
must be remembered that Logan Valley and the line of cases stretch-
ing behind it are not dead, nor has their reasoning been refuted by
the Court's arguments in Tanner. High-rise, multi-purpose downtown
centers covering several city blocks and blending in with the tradi-
tional "public" areas of the city are certainly more analogous to
Marsh and its public function test than the shopping center in
Tanner. Thus, long-held precedent (state and federal), Tanner's
own problematic analyses, the factual distinctions between shopping
centers and city centers, and, ultimately, the constant pressures to
expand the public forum as the concept of what is public expands
in our society, all indicate that Tanner will not likely be as innovative
as its initial impression appears.
CONCLUSION
Tanner is inconsistent with virtually every major first amendment
case decided by the Supreme Court in the middle third of this cen-
tury. Whether the Court's emphasis on the property right, however
tenuous or theoretical that interest may seem, is an indication of
where constitutional law is moving, it is at least clear that the Burger
Court is putting the brakes on the Warren Court's acceleration of
the Hague "public places" doctrine. At this point it can be safely
81. A U.S. congressional candidate with few funds explained how the Tanner
decision sharply curtailed any realistic access to his largely suburban district; in
the six-way primary race, he lost.
Livonia typifies many of the difficulties of politics in the new suburbs. For a
candidate, especially an insurgent with a limited local organization, suburbs
like Livonia are virtually impregnable.
There is no real center to it, only shopping centers . . . . The first line of
escape from Detroit, Livonia developed around the automobile, not the
pedestrian .... What cohesion the community has lies in the shared asphalt
of interchangeable parking lots and Burger Chefs.
The difficulties of campaigning in Livonia were significantly increased by
a Supreme Court ruling this summer. The Court drastically limited the rights
of political access to privately-owned shopping centers and closed for me
whatever small chance existed of reaching the suburbanites while they con-
sumed.
Shapiro, One Who Lost, 4 THE WASHINGTON MONTHLY 7, 11 (Dec. 1972);
see State v. Miller, 280 Minn. 566, 159 N.W.2d 895 (1968) (Logan Valley
protects handbilling for a political candidate on shopping center premises).
82. Wall Street Journal, Feb. 20, 1969, at 21, col. 1.
83. Breckenfeld, supra note 73, at 156; see 48 CHAIN STORE AGE 4 (Aug.
1972), 48 CHAIN STORE AGE 35 (April 1972); 47 CHAIN SroRE AGE 26 (July
1971); 44 CHAIN STORE AGE 22 (Sept. 1968).
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said that Logan Valley is limited to the proposition that reasonably
regulated first amendment activities conveying some message about
a shopping center or one of its stores are protected by the first and
fourteenth amendments. In any other situation, the Court is likely to
hold for the supremacy of the property owner's right to prohibit any
specific noncommercial activity he wishes, provided that the owner
makes no exception. Where on a continuum between shopping cen-
ters and company towns the emerging private city centers are likely to
be placed is hard to predict. But the Court would be hard put to
justify placing these new "cities" within the narrow confines of
Tanner.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol7/iss1/9
